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Abstract
To cope quickly with all types of failure risks (link, node and Shared Risk Link Group
(SRLG)), each router detecting a failure on an outgoing interface activates locally all the
backup paths protecting the primary paths which traverse the failed interface. With the
observation that upon a SRLG failure, some active backup paths are inoperative and do not
really participate to the recovery (since they do not receive any traffic flow), we propose
a new algorithm (SRLG structure exploitation algorithm or SSEA) exploiting the SRLG
structures to enhance the admission control and improve the protection rate.
With our algorithm, more flexibility is provided for the backup path selection since a
backup path which protects against the failure of a link belonging to a SRLG does not
systematically bypass all the links of that SRLG. Moreover, our algorithm permits to save
more bandwidth because it does not allocate the bandwidth for the inoperative backup paths
even if they are activated.
Simulations show that our algorithm SSEA decreases the ratio of rejected backup paths
and, it reduces in distributed environments the average number of messages sent to manage
the bandwidth information necessary for the backup path computation.
Key words: network, local protection, SRLG, bandwidth sharing, path computation
1 Introduction
With the intense deployment of network real-time applications (voice over IP, TV,
network games, etc.) in the last decade, fast recovery from network failures be-
comes desirable to ensure the communication service continuity. Hence, to cope
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quickly with network failures, local (proactive) protection pre-computing and often
pre-configuring backup paths is preferred and adopted [1,2].
With the advent of MPLS (MultiProtocol Label Switching) [3] in the last decade,
local protection is provided in efficient manner. In fact, MPLS offers a great flex-
ibility for path (Label switched Path or LSP) selection and provides mechanisms
allowing resource 1 reservations 2 and backup path preconfigurations. 3 Moreover
and contrarily to the local protection in low layers (e.g. p cycles [4]), MPLS per-
mits permits the separation of the traffic in several classes and to choose the classes
of traffic to be protected.
In order to cope with any physical failure 4 in a logical (MPLS/IP) level, three types
of failure risks are defined: link, node and Shared Link Risk Group (SRLG). The
first type of failure risk corresponds to the risk of a logical link failure due to the
breakdown of an exclusive physical component of the logical link. The second type
of failure risk corresponds to the risk of a logical node failure due to the breakdown
of an exclusive physical component of the logical node. Finally, the third type of
risk corresponds to a set of logical links that share a common physical component
(optical fiber, crossconnect, etc.) whose failure may impact all links in the set [5–7].
Two types of backup LSP are defined for MPLS local protection [8]: Next HOP
(NHOP) LSP and Next Next HOP (NNHOP) LSP. A NHOP LSP (resp. NNHOP
LSP) is a backup path protecting against link failure (resp. node failure); it is setup
between a primary node called Point of Local Repair (PLR) and one primary node
downstream to the PLR (resp. to the PLR next-hop) called Merge Point (MP). Such
backup LSP bypasses the link (resp. the node) downstream to the PLR on the pri-
mary LSP. When a link failure (resp. node failure) is detected by a node, this later
activates locally all its NHOP and NNHOP (resp. its NNHOP) backup LSPs by
switching traffic from the affected primary LSPs to their backup LSPs.
In order to ensure that there is enough bandwidth after a failure (i.e. to guarantee the
communication repair success), the backup paths should reserve the bandwidth they
need beforehand. Besides, to decrease the bandwidth allocations and accept much
more connection establishments, the practical hypothesis of single failure is often
adopted [9,6,10,11,7,12,13]. With such hypothesis, all the backup paths protecting
against failures of different components can share their bandwidth allocations (on
their common links) since they cannot be active at the same time.
Several classical approaches [9,6,10,11,7,12,13] are developed to optimize the band-
1 In this paper, resource refers to bandwidth.
2 Resource reservations ensure enough resource is available after the recovery from a fail-
ure.
3 Backup LSP preconfiguration decreases recovery time down to 50 ms.
4 A single failure affects only one physical component. Such failure can affect several log-
ical components since a physical component can be shared by several logical components.
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width allocated to the backup paths (called also protection bandwidth). In such ap-
proaches, the authors suggest to determine the cumulative bandwidth of the backup
paths which would be activated on each link, after each possible failure. We note
that a backup path is activated if its head-end router detects a failure on the pro-
tected link or node. As only the activate backup paths can really use their re-
sources, the classical approaches propose to allocate the maximum of cumulative
bandwidths of backup paths which could be active at the same time on each link.
Contrarily to the protection against link and node failure risks which uses only one
backup path for each primary path, the protection against a SRLG risk employs sev-
eral backup paths, one for each link which belongs to the primary protected path
and to the SRLG. Moreover, for fast recovery from a SRLG failure, all the backup
paths which protect against the failure of links belonging to the failed SRLG will be
activated simultaneously. With the observation that some activated backup paths do
not really use their resources (bandwidth) after a SRLG failure (because the traffic
of the primary paths they protect was switched towards other backup paths which
bypass their head-end routers), we propose in this article to enhance the protection
quality and increase the bandwidth sharing by extending its application to some
activated backup paths. In our approach, we explore the SRLG structures to deter-
mine the active backup paths which do not really use their resources after certain
SRLG failures. Such active backup paths are in reality inoperative after such fail-
ures since they do not consume the bandwidth. In order to decrease the protection
bandwidth that is allocated on each link, we propose to limit the concurrence for
protection bandwidth to the backup paths which can be operative at the same time.
In our proposition, more flexibility is provided for backup path selection since a
backup path does not systematically bypass all the links sharing a SRLG with the
protected link.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review some works
related to the bandwidth sharing. In Section 3, we give a SRLG structure based
classification of the backup paths that permits to improve the backup path computa-
tion. In our classification, the backup paths are grouped into two sets: the operative
backup paths which receive the rerouted traffic after a failure, and the inoperative
backup paths which do not receive any traffic after a failure, although they are
active. In Section 4, we propose and describe a new algorithm (SRLG Structure
Exploitation Algorithm or SSEA) which decreases the protection bandwidth allo-
cations and provides more flexibility for the backup path selection. In Section 5, we
give some ideas and propositions for the implementation of the SRLG structure ex-
ploitation algorithm in both centralized and distributed environments. In Section 6,
we present and analyze some simulation results and we give, in Section 7, some
conclusions.
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2 Related Work
With the increasing interest for local proactive protection in the last decade, several
works [1,2,9,6,10,11,7,12,13] have been devoted to the determination of algorithms
computing the backup paths. To minimize the quantity of bandwidth allocated on
links while avoiding the bandwidth constraint violation (bandwidth insufficiency),
the Backup Path Computation (BPC) algorithms require the knowledge of some
information like the primary and backup paths, bandwidth allocations and protected
risks.
Depending on the number of simultaneous failures that we would tolerate, the quan-
tity of bandwidth reserved on each link for protection can be high (large number of
simultaneous failures) or low (small number of simultaneous failures). Indeed, the
number of simultaneous failures that can be processed successfully determine all
the failure scenarios, which in turn control the number and structures of the backup
paths which provide the protection. Due to the rarety of multiple failures 5 and the
complexity to protect (in local and proactive manner) against this type of failure,
and in order to increase the bandwidth availability (increase the bandwidth sharing),
most of works in the literature consider only single failures [9,6,10,11,7,12,13].
With such type of failure (i.e. a single failure), the quantity of bandwidth that
should be reserved on each link for protection, depends on the cumulative band-
width of the paths which could be active at the same time after any single failure
occurrence. Two strategies of bandwidth sharing are defined to reduce the protec-
tion bandwidth allocations: backup-backup bandwidth sharing and backup-primary
bandwidth sharing.
In the first strategy (backup-backup bandwidth sharing), the quantities of protec-
tion bandwidth allocated on links are decreased significantly with the application
of the bandwidth sharing between the backup paths [9,6,10,11,7,12,14]. This type
of bandwidth sharing is made possible thanks to the hypothesis of single failures
which ensures that some backup paths cannot be active (they do not use their band-
width) at the same time. Thus, only the backup paths protecting against a same risk
can be in concurrence for bandwidth allocation.
When a new backup path is being computed, control admission is applied on all its
links to verify the bandwidth constraints. Two concepts are defined in [6] to ensure
the respect of the protection bandwidth constraints: protection failure risk group
and protection cost.
The protection failure risk group of a backup path b, denoted PFRG (b), is a set
composed of all the risks whose failure activates the backup path b. With the defi-
nition of the function Act as follows (BPaths is the set of all the backup paths and
Risks is the set of all the network failure risks):
5 The most frequent multiple dependant failures are SRLG failures
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Act : BPaths×Risks→{0, 1}
(b, r) 7→ y =
 1 if b is active upon the failure of r0 otherwise
We determine the protection failure risk group of a backup path b as follows:
PFRG (b) = {r\r ∈ Risks and Act (b, r) = 1} (1)
The protection cost of a risk r on a link λ, denoted δλr , corresponds to the cumulative
bandwidth of the backup paths which will be activated on the unidirectional link
λ upon a failure of the risk r. It is computed as follows (bw (b) is the bandwidth
required by the backup path b):
δλr =
∑
b∈BPaths∧λ∈ b
Act (b, r)× bw (b) (2)
For a SRLG risk srlg composed of link risks (l1, l2, .., ln), the protection cost on a
link λ verifies always the following equality: δλsrlg =
∑
0<i≤n δλli .
To compute a new backup path b, only the unidirectional links λ verifying the fol-
lowing inequality can be used:
Prλ +Maxr∈PFRG(b) (δλr ) + bw (b) ≤ Cλ (3)
where Prλ is the the cumulated bandwidth of the backup paths traversing the arc λ
and Cλ is the capacity of the arc λ.
To cope successfully with any single failure, the amount of protection bandwidth
Bkλ that should be reserved on each link λ is determined as follows:
Bkλ =Maxr (δ
λ
r ) (4)
The backup-backup bandwidth sharing strategy improves substantially the band-
width use and decreases the blocking probability. It is easy to be deployed in cen-
tralized environments where the unique BPCE (Backup Path Computation Element)
knows all the bandwidth information (like protection costs, link capacities, cumu-
lative primary bandwidths, etc.) that is required for the backup path computation.
Indeed, the centralized BPCE can deduce the values of all the bandwidth param-
eters used in (3) from the structures and properties of the paths which it has pre-
viously computed. In distributed environments however, the advertisement of the
bandwidth information that is required for the backup path computation is costly
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and could overload the network. Thus, using heuristics aggregating and/or reducing
this bandwidth information before its advertisement in the network could give some
interesting and practical solutions [9,11,7,12,14]. For instance, to decrease the size
and frequency of the advertisement messages, the Kini’s heuristic [9] suggests to
approximate all the protection costs on a given unidirectional link by the highest
protection cost on that link (i.e. ∀(λ, r) : δλr is approximated by Maxr (δλr )). In
this way, a given unidirectional link λ can be used to establish a new backup path b
if it verifies the following inequality: Prλ +Maxr (δλr ) + bw (b) ≤ Cλ.
In the second strategy (backup-primary bandwidth sharing), another style of band-
width sharing (bandwidth sharing between the primary and backup paths) is applied
to decrease the protection bandwidth allocated on links. This type of sharing was
proposed for the first time in [13]. It suggests to (pre)allocate the bandwidth freed
by the deactivated (or bypassed) primary path segments upon a failure of a risk r
to the backup paths which will be activated to recover from that failure. For in-
stance, when a protected link (resp. an unprotected link) u-v traversed by a primary
path p fails, a quantity of bandwidth equal to the bandwidth of p is freed on all the
links located between the end nodes of the backup path repairing the primary path
p (resp. on all the links located between the failed link and the destination node
of the primary path p). Such freed bandwidth is then assigned to the backup paths
which will be activated to recover from the failure of link u-v.
To avoid the violation of the bandwidth constraints with this second strategy, only
the unidirectional links λ verifying the following inequality can be selected to be
in a new backup path b:
Prλ +Maxr∈PFRG(b) (δλr + bw (b)− F λr , 0) ≤ Cλ (5)
To cope successfully with any single failure, the amount of protection bandwidth
Bkλ that should be reserved on each link λ is determined as follows:
Bkλ =Maxr (δ
λ
r − F λr , 0) (6)
where F λr is the total primary bandwidth freed on the link λ after a failure of the
risk r.
Compared to the first strategy of bandwidth sharing, this second strategy can en-
hance the bandwidth availability but it introduces several new drawbacks. Firstly, it
complicates the resource preemption since the elimination of a primary path does
not systematically free the associated bandwidth (because the bandwidth could be
shared between a primary path and some backup paths). Secondly, it increases the
amount of information that should be advertised in the network to enable the BPC
to be performed in distributed environments. Concretely, in addition to the informa-
tion required to perform the control admission with the first strategy, the application
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of the second strategy of bandwidth sharing requires the knowledge of the quanti-
ties of primary bandwidth freed on the links for all single failures.
Although there are some activated backup paths which do no receive any traffic
after a SRLG failure, both the bandwidth sharing methods of the first and the second
strategies allocate them bandwidth. This wastes bandwidth and blocks uselessly
some protection requests.
3 Motivations
For fast recovery, each router detecting a failure on one of its outgoing interfaces
activates locally all the backup paths which protect the primary paths traversing the
failed interface. Although active, some backup paths (inoperative backup paths)
do not participate to the recovery of the affected communications because the traf-
fic was already redirected by upstream routers onto other backup paths (operative
backup paths) bypassing their head-end routers.
By limiting the concurrence for the protection bandwidth to the operative backup
paths, we decrease the protection bandwidth allocations. Besides, with the restric-
tion of the protection failure risk group of a backup path b to the risks whose failure
operates the backup path b, we provide more flexibility for the path selection.
Before describing our improvement propositions, we show in the next subsection
the difference between the set of the active backup paths and the set of the operative
paths, upon failure. Next, we propose and describe an algorithm permitting the
determination of the operative backup paths, by using the structures of the SRLGs.
3.1 Active backup paths vs. operative backup paths
Due to the difficulty to distinguish quickly between the types of failure (node, link
or SRLG), each router detecting a failure on an outgoing interface activates all the
backup paths which protect the primary paths traversing 6 the affected interface.
As a single physical failure can affect many logical links (e.g. in case of a SRLG
failure), several backup paths protecting a same primary path can be activated upon
one single physical failure. In some situations, the head-end router of an activated
backup path b1 is bypassed by another activated backup path b2 that protects a same
primary path. In such a case, the backup path b1 does not receive and reroute the
traffic of the affected primary path; it is considered as inoperative since it does not
6 If a node failure can be distinguished quickly from a link failure, only NNHOP paths are
activated after a node failure.
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Fig. 1. Local protection of a primary path
really use its resources (particularly the bandwidth). Hence, the bandwidth allo-
cated for such inoperative path can be freed and reallocated to other paths. Contrar-
ily to the backup path b1, the other backup path b2 really participates to the recovery
since it reroutes the traffic of the affected primary path. This path is considered as
operative. Its resources (particularly the bandwidth) cannot be reallocated to other
paths.
In figure 1, two backup paths b1A (A→F→G→D) and b1B (B→C→E→H→G→D)
are setup to protect the primary path p1 (A→B→D) against the failure of the four
following risks: node B, link A-B, link B-D and SRLG srlg = (A-B, B-D). When
the router A (resp. router B) detects a failure on the interface leading to its adjacent
router B (resp. router D), it activates locally the backup path b1A (resp. b1B) which
protects the unique primary path traversing the failed interface. Hence, for the fail-
ure of node B or the failure of link A-B (resp. the failure of link B-D), traffic of the
affected primary path p1 will be switched onto the unique activated backup path
b1A (resp. b1B). As only one outgoing interface of the primary path routers can be
affected upon a single link or a single node failure, we conclude that at most one
backup path per primary path could be activated. As a result, all the backup paths
activated to recover from a link or node failure really receive and reroute the traffic
Fig. 2. Backup path activation and traffic rerouting
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(a) Two operative backup paths upon the
SRLG failure
(b) One operative backup path upon the
SRLG failure
Fig. 3. Operative backup paths
of the affected primary paths.
With risks of type SRLG however, some activated backup paths do not receive or
reroute the traffic of the affected primary paths. For instance, when the SRLG srlg
in figure 1 fails, all the end routers of the srlg’s links (i.e. routers A, B and D) will
detect a failure. As a result, all the backup paths protecting an affected primary
path and whose head-end router is an end router of the links belonging to the failed
SRLG will be activated (cf. figure 2). Typically, the backup path b1A (resp. b1B) will
be activated since it protects the affected primary path (p1) and its head-end router
A (resp. B) is an end router of a link A-B (resp. B-D) belonging to the affected
SRLG srlg. As the traffic switching toward a backup path results in the bypassing
of a primary path segment located between the head-end and the tail-end routers
of the backup path, we deduce that only the backup path b1A receives and reroutes
the traffic of the affected primary path p1 after the recovery from the failure of the
SRLG srlg. Indeed, after the activation of the backup path b1A, the traffic of the
primary path p1 is forwarded on the path A→F→G→D: the head-end router B of
the second activated backup path b1B is bypassed and thus, no packet traverses this
backup path.
3.2 Exploiting the SRLG structures to determine the set of operative backup paths
In order to determine the set of operative backup paths OPBr upon a failure of
a risk r, we consider the simple risks (node and link risks) and composite risks
(SRLGs). With a simple failure risk r, the operative backup path set OPBr is com-
posed of all the activated backup paths upon a failure of r (cf. section 3.1). With a
composite risk srlg, a backup path b protecting a primary path p is in the operative
backup path set OPBsrlg if and only if:
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(1) The backup path b protects against the failure of a link belonging to the SRLG
srlg.
(2) There is no backup path b’ (b’ 6= b) such as:
• b’ protects the primary path p against the failure of a link belonging to the
SRLG srlg,
• The sub-path of p located between the end routers of b’ contains, as transit
router, the head-end router of the backup path b.
To better understand the procedure of determination of the operative backup paths
upon a SRLG failure, let us consider an example. In figure 3, a primary path p
(A→D→F→G) traversing the unique SRLG srlg = (A-D, D-F, F-G) of the net-
work is established. To protect this primary path against the failure of link F-G,
we setup a same NHOP backup path F→C→A→B→E→G in both sub-figures (bF
in the sub-figure 3(a) and b′F in the sub-figure 3(b)). To protect the primary path
p against the failure of node D (and against the failure of link A-D), we used a
different backup path in each sub-figure. Hence, in sub-figure 3(a), we setup the
backup path bA (A→C→F) and in sub-figure 3(b), we configured the backup path
b′A (A→B→E→G).
Upon a failure of the SRLG srlg, the nodes A and F activate the backup paths bA and
bF in the sub-figure 3(a) (resp. the backup paths b′A and b
′
F in the sub-figure 3(b))
for recovery. In figure 3(a), both the backup paths bA and bF become operative after
the recovery from the SRLG failure. In fact, the backup path bA (resp. bF ) protects
the primary path p against the failure of a srlg’s link A-D (resp. F-G) and its head-
end router A (resp. F) does not belong to the primary path segment located between
the end routers F and G (resp. A and F) of the unique other backup path bF (resp.
bA) protecting the primary path p (against the failure of a link in the same SRLG
srlg). In figure 3(b) however, only the backup path b′A becomes operative (for the
same reasons as bA in figure 3(a)) upon the failure of the unique network SRLG
srlg. The second backup path b′F is inoperative upon the failure of the SRLG srlg
since there is another backup path b′A verifying these two conditions: (1) b
′
A protects
the primary path p (i.e. the same primary path as the one protected by b′F ) against
the failure of a link (A-D) belonging to srlg. (2) The sub-path (A→D→F→G) of
p located between the end routers (A and G) of b′A contains, as transit router, the
head-end router (F) of the backup path b′F .
4 Using SRLG structures to enhance the BPC
As described in the previously, the exploitation of the SRLG structures permits
to determine the operative backup paths after a SRLG failure. In this section, we
show that we can enhance the backup path computation with the exploitation of the
SRLG structure information. Typically, we reduce the protection bandwidth allo-
cations by limiting the concurrence for the protection bandwidth to the operative
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backup paths. Besides, we provide more flexibility for the backup path selection by
restricting the set of failure risks that should be bypassed by the backup paths.
4.1 Decreasing the bandwidth allocation
Instead of using the activity state of backup paths to allocate the protection band-
width, we propose here to exploite the operativity state of backup paths to reduce
the protection bandwidth allocations. Before showing how to utilize the operativity
state of backup paths to enhance the protection bandwidth allocation, let us defining
a new function Op as follows:
Op : BPaths×Risks→{0, 1}
(b, r) 7→ y =
 1 if b is operative upon the failure of r0 otherwise
where: BPaths is the set of all the backup paths and Risks is the set of all the
network failure risks.
As only the operative backup paths receive traffic upon failure, we propose to limit
the concurrence for the protection bandwidth allocation to the operative backup
paths. In this way, the protection bandwidth allocations are reduced since a backup
path which is inoperative after a failure of a given SRLG does not require to reserve
any unit of bandwidth to cope with the failure of that SRLG.
To manage the set of risks whose failure operates a backup path b, we reduce the
protection failure risk group of b and define the Restricted Protection Failure Risk
Group of b (or RPFRG (b)) as follows:
RPFRG (b) = {r\r ∈ Risks and Op (b, r) = 1} (7)
In addition to the reduction of the protection failure risk group set, we modify (2)
to exploit the operative/inoperative state information when the backup paths are
computed. Hence, we define the protection price γλr as the cumulative bandwidth
of the operative backup paths on the unidirectional link λ upon the failure of the
risk r. It is determined as follows:
γλr =
∑
b∈BPaths \λ∈ b
Op (b, r)× bw (b) (8)
With the substitution of the couple (PFRG (b), δλr ) by the couple (RPFRG (b), γ
λ
r )
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in (3), (4), (5) and (6), we obtain the formulas ensuring the respect of the bandwidth
constraints and allowing the computation of the minimal protection bandwidth to
be allocated on each unidirectional link.
Concretely, with the backup-backup bandwidth sharing, we have:
Prλ +Maxr∈RPFRG(b) (γλr ) + bw (b) ≤ Cλ (9)
Bkλ =Maxr (γ
λ
r ) (10)
With the primary-backup bandwidth sharing, we have:
Prλ +Maxr∈RPFRG (b) (γλr + bw (b)− F λr , 0) ≤ Cλ (11)
Bkλ =Maxr (γ
λ
r − F λr , 0) (12)
Since the set of the operative backup paths is included in the set of the activated
backup paths (i.e. ∀ b ∈ BPaths : RPFRG (b) ⊆ PFRG (b))), we deduce that
all the protection prices are lower or equal to their corresponding protection costs
(∀(r, λ) : γλr ≤ δλr ). As a result, much more protection bandwidth is saved.
Example: Let us applying the backup-backup bandwidth sharing to the link A→B
in figure 3(b).
Without the exploitation of the SRLG structures, we compute the minimal protec-
tion bandwidth Bk1AB allocated on the link A→B as follows:
Bk1AB =Max(δ
AB
AD, δ
AB
D , δ
AB
FG, δ
AB
srlg) = δ
AB
srlg = 2× bw (p)
With the exploitation of the SRLG structures, we compute the minimal protection
bandwidth Bk2AB allocated on the link A→B as follows:
Bk2AB =Max(γ
AB
AD, γ
AB
D , γ
AB
FG , γ
AB
srlg) = γ
AB
srlg = bw (p)
Thus, we note that Bk2AB = 50%Bk1AB
By assuming that CAB = 2 × bw (p), in the first case no new primary path (resp.
backup path protecting against the risks in {A-D, D, F-G, srlg1}) can traverse the
link A→B whereas in the second case any new primary path p′ (resp. any backup
path b′) of bandwidth bw (p′) ≤ CAB/2 (resp. bw (b′) ≤ CAB/2) can be routed on
the link A→B. Thus, we have decreased the bandwidth allocation for the backup
paths and provide the capability to setup more of primary or backup paths with the
same overall network resource.
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4.2 Providing flexibility for the backup path selection
In addition to the protection bandwidth decrease, the exploitation of the SRLG
structures in the BPC has another important advantage: it provides more flexibility
for the backup path selection and improves the quality of protection (i.e. the num-
ber of protected risks on a primary path is increased) by reducing the set of risks
that a backup path must bypass. In our approach, a new backup path b does not
systematically bypass all the SRLGs containing the link to be protected. Instead,
only the node and link to be protected and the SRLGs whose failure operates the
new backup path b should be bypassed (i.e. only the risks in RPFRG (b)).
Since the set of links (and nodes) that a backup path should bypass must be known
before the start of its computation, to apply our approach it would be necessary
to determine beforehand whether a backup path is operative or not after a failure
of any risk. By analyzing the sufficient conditions (cf. section 3.2) allowing the
determination of the operative backup paths, we deduce that the links traversed
by a backup path have no incidence on the operative state of that backup path
upon failure. Indeed, only (1) the protected link and node, (2) the head-end router
of the backup path b in computation, and (3) all the backup paths protecting a
same primary path as b against the failure of an upstream link (which belongs
to the same SRLG as the protected link) to the link to be protected, are used to
deduce the operative state of b upon any given failure. Thus, the risks forming the
restricted protection failure risks group of any backup path can be deduced before
its computation, in condition that the backup paths protecting against the failures
of upstream links are completely determined.
In figure 3(b) for instance, any computed backup path b′D protecting the primary
path p against the failure of the link D→F is inoperative upon the failure of the
SRLG srlg. Indeed, upon such failure, the traffic is switched by the router A onto
the backup path b′A which joins the primary path p on a router G downstream to
the head-end router D of the backup path b′D. Since after the recovery from the
failure of the SRLG srlg, the rerouted traffic reaches its destination router G without
traversing the path b′D, we conclude that, independently on the links forming b
′
D,
this last backup path b′D is inoperative upon a failure of the SRLG srlg. Thus, the
new backup path b′D can utilize the arc D→A to protect against the failure of its
next hop, although the link D-A and the link to be protected D-F belong to the
same SRLG srlg. This permits to decrease the blocking probability (i.e. probability
that a new request be rejected) and provides more flexibility for the backup path
selection.
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4.3 SRLG structure exploitation algorithm (SSEA)
In order to decrease the protection bandwidth allocations (cf. section 4.1) and to
offer more flexibility for the backup path selection (cf. section 4.1), we propose a
new algorithm SSEA (cf. algorithm 1) taking into account the SRLG structures to
enhance the BPC. Thus, to compute a new backup path b, we determine in the first
step of our algorithm SSEA the restricted protection failure risk group of the backup
path b (i.e. RPFRG (b)). This restricted protection failure risk group is formed of
all the elements in PFRG (b) except the risks whose failure does not operate the
backup path b. In order to denote the elements of RPFRG (b), we say that a given
risk is really protected by the backup path b if and only if such risk is in RPFRG (b).
In the second step of our algorithm SSEA, we eliminate from the network topology
all the links and nodes which belong to the risks in RPFRG (b). In this way, no
failure risk can affect simultaneously both a primary path and one of its backup
paths. Obviously, since the set of risks to be bypassed by each new backup path is
reduced, more flexibility is provided for the path selection.
In order to ensure the respect of the bandwidth constraints, we apply in the third step
Algorithm 1 Computation of a backup path b with the SRLG structure exploitation
algorithm
inputs
A graph G = (V, E) corresponding to the network topology. V is the set of vertices
(routers) and E is the set of edges (links)
begin algorithm
1. {Determination of the set RPFRG (b) which is composed of the risks whose
failure operates the backup path b}
RPFRG (b) ← {r \ Op (b, r) = 1}
2. {Determination of the links which should be bypassed by the backup path b}
E” ← {λ ∈ E \ ∃ r ∈ RPFRG (b): λ ∈ r}
{Determination of the nodes which should be bypassed by the backup path b}
V” ← {n ∈ V \ ∃ r ∈ RPFRG (b): n ∈ r}
3. {Determination of the links verifying the bandwidth constraints}
if backup backup sharing only then
E’ ← {λ \ λ ∈ E ∧ Prλ +Maxr∈RPFRG(b) (γλr ) + bw (b) ≤ Cλ}
else
E’ ← {λ \ λ ∈ E ∧ Prλ +Maxr∈RPFRG(b) (γλr + bw (b)− F λr , 0) ≤ Cλ}
end if
4. {Determination of the backup path b}
Use any local protection technique (one-to-one backup or facility backup) and
any path computation algorithm to determine the backup path b on the graph
G’ = (V \ V”, E’ \ E”)
end algorithm
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Fig. 4. A backup path traversing a link of a SRLG containing the protected link
of our algorithm SSEA inequality 9 (for the backup-backup bandwidth sharing) or
inequality 11 (for the primary-backup bandwidth sharing) to select the links which
can be used for the next backup path computation. Clearly, all the links which do
not satisfy inequality 9 (or inequality 11 for the primary-backup bandwidth sharing)
are pruned from the network topology before the BPC starts.
In the last step of our algorithm SSEA, we deduce one backup path providing the
desired protection by running any path computation algorithm (e.g. CSPF) with
the use of any local protection technique (one-to-one backup protection or facility
backup protection [8]). Thus, our algorithm is generic and compatible with any path
computation algorithm and any local protection technique.
To better understand our algorithm, let us consider the example in figure 3(b). Sup-
pose that we are trying to compute a new backup path b′D protecting the primary
path p against the failure of the node F and link D-F. Assume also that all the net-
work links have a capacity of one unit. Independently on the chosen local protection
technique, the backup path b′D must interconnect node D to node G.
With the application of the classical BPC algorithms, no path can support b′D since
such path would bypass all the links (A-D, D-F, F-G) belonging to the SRLG srlg
(note that srlg is in PFRG (b′D) and srlg includes the protected link D-F). With our
algorithm SSEA however (step 1 of algorithm 1), the probability to determine a
path for b′D is increased since the set of risks that the backup path b
′
D should bypass
is reduced to the sub-set RPFRG (b′D) (note that RPFRG (b
′
D) ⊆ PFRG (b′D)). Typ-
ically, the links A-D and F-G of the SRLG srlg can be used to establish the backup
path b′D since srlg does not belong to RPFRG (b
′
D) (RPFRG (b
′
D) = {D-F, F}). In
the second step of algorithm 1, we eliminate from the network topology, the links
(link D-F) and nodes (node F) composing the risks of RPFRG (b′D). In the third
step of algorithm 1, we eliminate from the network topology the unique (unidirec-
tional) link A→D which does not verify (9) (A→D is also the unique unidirectional
link which does not verify (11)). After that, we can run any CSPF algorithm to de-
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termine the unique backup path D→A→B→E→G interconnecting node D to node
G (figure 4).
Note that the three backup paths b′A, b
′
D, and b
′
F (in figure 4) share totally their band-
width on the common path segment A→B→E→G although they protect against
the failure of links belonging to the same SRLG. This sharing does not induce any
bandwidth constraint violation because the three backup paths b′A, b
′
D, and b
′
F can-
not be operative at the same time.
5 Implementation requirements for the SRLG structure exploitation algo-
rithm
With a centralized implementation of the SRLG structure exploitation algorithm,
the unique BPCE can store all the information about the network topology, the
SRLG structures and the path properties (traversed links, type, bandwidth, etc.).
From such information, the centralized BPCE determines the bandwidth parame-
ter values of each link (cumulative primary bandwidth, protection prices, primary
bandwidth freed) and deduces the best backup paths.
We note that to improve the protection quality, the centralized BPCE should es-
tablish a computation order for the backup paths protecting a same primary path.
Indeed, to determine the final operative state of each backup path (cf. section 3.2),
the BPCE should begin with the protection of the links closest to the head-end
router of each primary path.
With a distributed implementation of the BPC taking account of the SRLG struc-
tures, a comparable information as that transmitted in the classical approaches
[9,6,10,7,12,13] is sufficient to avoid the violation of the bandwidth constraints.
For instance, the information advertised with the approach described in [6,10,12]
is sufficient to decrease the bandwidth allocation. However, a very slight transfor-
mation of the advertised information (replacement of the protection cost values by
the corresponding protection price values) is required with [9,7,13].
To enhance the protection quality with the distributed approaches, it is necessary
that each BPCE determines, upon any failure, whether the backup path that is be-
ing computed is operative or not before the start of its computation. This can be
done by establishing a computation order for the backup paths which protect the
same primary path (against the failure of the same SRLG). Typically, before start-
ing the computation of a new backup path b, each PLR should verify that all the
backup paths, which protect against the failures of upstream links of the primary
path protected by b, are already computed and configured.
With slight extensions to the signaling protocols (RSVP-TE [15]), the computation
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order of backup paths can be imposed. Concretely, each PLR can notify 7 its down-
stream routers of the accomplishment of the configuration of its backup path. Thus,
to guarantee the respect of the backup path computation order, each PLR should
wait for the notifications of all its upstream routers before it starts to compute its
backup path.
6 Analysis and simulation results
6.1 Simulation model
In order to evaluate the performances of the SRLG structure exploitation algorithm
(SSEA), we compared it to the Kini’s heuristic and TDRA algorithm. We chose
the Kini’s heuristic for its practicability whereas we opted for the TDRA algorithm
for its efficiency to determine the backup paths reducing the protection bandwidth
allocation.
6.1.1 Comparison metrics
Four metrics are used for the comparison: ratio of rejected backup paths (RRP),
relative gain in backup path rejection (RGR), normalized SRLG bandwidth (NSB)
and average number of messages (ANM) transmitted in the network per configured
backup path.
The first metric measures the ratio of backup paths that are rejected because of the
lack of protection bandwidth on the network links. It corresponds to the ratio be-
tween the number of backup path requests that are rejected and the total number of
backup path requests (RRP = #rejected protection requests / #protection requests).
The second metric calculates the gain in the RRP values obtained by using a new
BPC method instead of an old one. It is determined as follows: RGR (newMeth,
oldMeth) = ( RRP (oldMeth) - RRP (newMeth) ) / RRP (oldMeth).
The third metric measures the amount of bandwidth allocated on links to protect
against the SRLG failures. It is determined as the ratio between the total amount
of bandwidth dedicated for the protection against the SRLG failures and the cumu-
lated bandwidth of the backup paths.
For the SRLG structure exploitation algorithm, we have:
NSB =
∑
(r is a SRLG, λ∈E)(γλr ) /
∑
(r is a link, λ∈E)(δλr )
7 The notifications can be included in the RSVP path messages refreshing the primary
protected path.
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(a) Medium size topology (95 risks) (b) Large size topology (162 risks)
Fig. 5. Test topologies
For the TDRA algorithm and the Kini’s heuristic, we have:
NSB =
∑
(r is a SRLG, λ∈E)(δλr ) /
∑
(r is a link, λ∈E)(δλr )
The fourth metric counts the (average) number of messages traversing the network
links, after each backup path establishment, to maintain and update the protection
bandwidth information necessary for the BPC (ANM =
∑
λ∈E #messages travers-
ing (λ) / #accepted protection requests where E is the set of network unidirectional
links).
Contrarily to the values of the metrics RRP, RGR and NSB, those of the metric
ANM depend strongly on the implementation type (centralized or distributed) and
on the mechanism distributing the information necessary for the BPC (flooding or
targeted advertisements). In a centralized environment, any BPC demand is trans-
mitted to the centralized server which processes it and sends back the computation
results to the requesting router. Hence, independently on the bandwidth sharing
strategies and on the BPC algorithms, the number of messages transmitted in the
network to process a set of requests is always the same. Accordingly, it is pointless
to compare the ANM of our proposition to those of the classical centralized BPC ap-
proaches. In a distributed environment, the BPC requests are generally processed
by the backup head-end routers themselves. As a result, no message (or a very
small number of messages) is transmitted in the network to send the BPC demands
and receive the results from the servers (BPCEs). However, to maintain an updated
bandwidth information about the shared parameters (protection prices/costs of the
SRLGs), some BPCEs should communicate. Two main processes are used: flood-
ing and targeted advertisement. In the simulations presented here, we opted for the
targeted advertisement implementation since it reduces the ANM values by limiting
the set of routers receiving the bandwidth information (cf. [12,7]).
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6.1.2 Topologies, SRLGs and traffic matrix generation
Two well known network topologies are used for our simulation. The first topology
(USA network), depicted in figure 5(a), is composed of 28 routers and 45 bidirec-
tional links. It is a network topology of a medium size where the average degree of
nodes is equal to 3.21. To take SRLG failures into account, we added to the topol-
ogy in figure 5(a) 22 SRLGs. These SRLG are generated so that the protection
against the failure of any risk remains physically possible. The second topology,
depicted in figure 5(b), is composed of 50 routers and 87 bidirectional links. It is
a network topology of a large size where the average degree of nodes is equal to
3.48. To take SRLG failures into account, we added to this topology (figure 5(b))
25 SRLGs. These SRLG are generated so that the protection against the failure of
any risk remains physically possible.
The traffic matrix is generated randomly and consists of requests arriving one by
one and asking for quantities of bandwidth uniformly distributed between 1 and
10. The head-end and tail-end routers of each primary path are chosen randomly
among the network routers.
6.1.3 Primary and backup path computations
To focus only on the impact of our proposition on the protection bandwidth allo-
cation and on the protection quality, we separated the task of primary path compu-
tation from that computing the backup paths (i.e. the task computing the primary
path is independent from that computing the backup paths). For this to be possible,
we divided the capacity of each unidirectional link in two disjoint pools: primary
pool and protection pool. The primary pool is used to allocate the bandwidth for
the primary paths whereas the protection pool is used for backup path bandwidth
allocations.
In our simulations, we considered that the primary pool capacities are sufficient
to satisfy all the requests of primary path establishment. In this manner, the same
primary paths, which are computed according to the shortest path first algorithm
(SPF with unitary weights), are used to compare SSEA, TDRA and Kini’s heuristic.
All the protection pool capacities of the network links in figure 5 are equal to
100 units except the bold links in figure 5(a) which have a capacity of 300 units.
The backup paths are computed according to the constrained shortest path first
algorithm (CSPF with unitary weights). Concretely, each backup path computed
with SSEA (resp. with TDRA or Kini’s heuristic) must bypass all the risks in its
restricted protection failure risk group (resp. its protection failure risk group). In
addition, each link λ belonging to a backup path b computed with SSEA (resp. with
TDRA and Kini’s heuristic) must verify the following inequality:Maxr∈RPFRG(b) γλr
+bw (b) ≤ BCλ (resp. Maxr∈PFRG(b) δλr + bw (b) ≤ BCλ).
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(a) Medium size topology (b) Large size topology
Fig. 6. Ratio of rejected backup paths (RRP)
Each primary node, different from the destination node and its upstream node, com-
putes a NNHOP backup path to protect against both its next link and node on the
primary path. The upstream node of the primary path destination node uses a NHOP
backup path to protect against the failure of its next link.
At each establishment of 20 primary paths, the four metrics RRP, RGR, NSB and
NMN are computed for all the compared methods. We note that our results corre-
spond to average values over 1000 runs.
6.2 Results and analysis
Figure 6 and figure 7 depict the evolution of RRP and RGR respectively as a func-
tion of the number of primary paths setup in the network (i.e. as a function of the
network load). The figure 6 shows clearly that the RRP values of SSEA algorithm
are lower and better (except for the 40 first primary paths where the RRP values of
the three compared methods are null) than those of TDRA algorithm which are in
turn lower than those of Kini’s heuristic.
(a) Medium size topology (b) Large size topology
Fig. 7. Relative gain in backup path rejection (RGR)
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(a) Medium size topology (b) Large size topology
Fig. 8. Normalized SRLG Bandwidth (NSB)
The wide difference in the RRP values between the Kini’s heuristic and the SSEA
algorithm is essentially due to the partial knowledge of the protection bandwidth
information with the Kini’s heuristic whereas the SSEA algorithm utilizes and has
a complete knowledge of the protection bandwidth parameter information. Thus,
the Kini’s heuristic overestimates the bandwidth parameters required for the BPC
whereas the SSEA algorithm uses exact values of these parameters in its computa-
tions. Obviously, the wide difference in the RRP values between the Kini’s heuristic
and the SSEA algorithm explains also the large relative gain in backup path rejec-
tion (i.e. RGR (SSEA, Kini)) when the SSEA algorithm is used instead of the Kini’s
heuristic. Concerning the comparison between the RRP values of TDRA and those
of SSEA, we note that the difference is significant although it is not high in rela-
tion to the total number of protection requests. For instance, the difference of the
RRP values in figure 6(a) varies between 5.16% and 5.76% when the number of
primary paths is between 380 and 540 whereas it varies in figure 6(b) between 5%
and 7.3% when the number of primary paths is between 180 and 520. In fact, for
practical RRP values located between 0 and 0.1 (the number of primary paths is
lower than 380 in figure 6(a) and lower than 200 in figure 7(b)), the relative gain of
using SSEA instead of TDRA is larger than 56% in figure 7(a) and larger than 68%
in figure 7(b) (i.e. more than 68% of the number of protection requests rejected by
TDRA are satisfied with SSEA in figure 7(b)). When rejection of the protection re-
quests is not allowed, figure 6(a) and figure 6(b) shows that the adoption of SSEA
algorithm instead of TDRA permits to increase the number of protected primary
paths from 60 to 80 and from 60 to 120 respectively.
In figure 8, the evolution of the normalized SRLG bandwidth (NSB) as a function of
the number of primary paths setup in the network is depicted. As we see, the appli-
cation of the SSEA algorithm instead of the TDRA algorithm and the Kini’s heuris-
tic permits to save up to 9% of the normalized SRLG bandwidth in figures 8(a)
and 8(b) (i.e. for the 20 first primary paths, we have NSB(SSEA)/NSB(TDRA)≈NSB(SSEA)/NSB(Kini)
≈ 1.09). This difference in the NSB values between SSEA and TDRA (or Kini’s
heuristic) is due to the limitation of the concurrence for the protection bandwidth
allocations (see section 4.1) and to the reduction of the risks to be bypassed by each
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(a) Medium size topology (b) Large size topology
Fig. 9. Average number of messages sent in the network per backup path (ANM)
backup path (see section 4.2) with SSEA (contrarily to TDRA algorithm and Kini’s
heuristic which waste the protection bandwidth and bypass more risks).
Another important point to highlight concerns the high difference between the nor-
malized SRLG bandwidth values obtained on the two test topologies. Indeed, for
the same number of primary paths, the normalized SRLG bandwidth in figure 8(a)
is often twice higher than that obtained in figure 8(b). This can be explained essen-
tially by the density of SRLGs 8 in figure 5(a) (equal to 0.48) which is higher than
than that obtained in figure 5(b) (equal to 0.28). According to our simulations, 9
we conclude that SSEA saves more protection bandwidth and reject less backup
paths than TDRA and Kini’s algorithm, when the density of SRLGs is high. In-
deed, larger the density of SRLGs is, more different the behaviors of SSEA and
TDRA (or Kini’s heuristic) are.
In figure 9, the evolution of the average number of messages transmitted in the
network (ANM) as a function of the number of primary paths setup in the network
is shown. In this performance study, we focused only on the SSEA and TDRA
algorithms. The ANM values of the Kini’s heuristic are not represented because
they are very high (see [12] for details about the comparison between the TDRA
algorithm and the Kini’s heuristic).
As shown in figures 9(a) and 9(b), the SSEA algorithm sends in average less mes-
sages on the network than the TDRA algorithm. This is due to the number of SRLG
risks protected by the SSEA algorithm which is smaller than that of the TDRA al-
gorithm. We note that, in figure 9(a) and 9(b), the difference of the ANM values be-
tween the SSEA algorithm and TDRA algorithm decreases slightly as the number
8 The density of SRLGs is determined as the ratio between the number of SRLGs and the
number of links.
9 In our simulations, the structures of SRLGs and their distribution are similar in the the
network topologies illustrated in figure 5. Moreover, the same computation algorithms are
applied to determine the paths.
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of setup primary paths increases. This comes from the augmentation of the SRLG
protection prices which induces in its turn the reduction of the rate of protected
SRLGs.
Note that the performances of the SSEA algorithm can be improved by favouring
primary paths which traverse more links of the same SRLGs. Moreover, design-
ing the network topologies could take SRLGs into account to enhance the backup
path computation (the location of SRLGs should be chosen so that the blocking
probability is decreased and the network deployment is minimized).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proved that it is possible to ensure the recovery from any single
failure without forcing the (new) backup paths to bypass all the SRLGs containing
the links to be protected. In fact, it is possible that a first active backup path does
not receive traffic upon a SRLG failure since the traffic was already rerouted onto
a second active backup path bypassing the head-end router of the first backup path.
In such a case, the first backup path does not require any resource (bandwidth) and
acts as an inoperative backup path upon that SRLG failure. However, the second
backup path acts as an operative backup path that requires the bandwidth to reroute
the traffic of the affected primary path. Obviously, only the operative paths (instead
of all the activated backup paths) upon a failure of a SRLG should protect against
the failure of that SRLG and can be in concurrence for a resource.
As the operative state of a backup path can be determined beforehand by taking the
SRLG structures into account, we proposed a new and efficient approach to com-
pute the backup paths. Our approach permits to increase the bandwidth availability
(it decreases the protection bandwidth allocations) and provides more flexibility for
the backup path selection (i.e. it improves the protection quality). It can be applied
in both centralized and distributed environments. It also allows efficient design of
networks since an effective combination of SRLGs can permit a significant reduc-
tion of the deployment cost without a decrease (or with a slight decrease) of the
protection quality.
Simulations results show that the adoption of our approach decreases the number
of rejected backup paths, increases significantly the relative gain in backup path
rejection and saves the protection bandwidth by comparison with classical backup
path computation algorithms. Moreover, when the backup path computations are
distributed on the network routers, our approach (SSEA algorithm) reduces the av-
erage number of messages sent in the network to maintain the protection bandwidth
information.
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